Bangladesh is witnessing a phenomenon more corrosive than a routine change in government. Reports suggest that power is increasingly being exercised not as a public trust, but as a private instrument serving select individuals and networks.
An interim administration is intended to be temporary, restrained, and constitutionally disciplined. Its role is to maintain state neutrality until citizens decide the country’s future at the ballot box. However, when an unelected authority assumes power under contested circumstances and then consistently delivers benefits to a specific individual and his associates, the country is not stabilised—it is quietly re-engineered.
This shift effectively shrinks the state for ordinary citizens and enlarges it for the connected few. Justice becomes negotiable, regulation selective, and public assets bargaining chips. The ultimate cost is borne by the general population.
Timeline of Alleged Favouritism and State Capture
A) Legal Reversals Protecting Dr Yunus
- 7 August 2024: The Labour Appellate Tribunal reportedly overturned a judgment against Grameen Telecom for breaching labour law, nullifying a six-month custodial sentence and a BDT 5,000 fine.
- 24 October 2024: The High Court reportedly quashed five additional labour-law cases filed against Dr Yunus by former employees.
- 11 August 2024: Proceedings in an Anti-Corruption Commission case alleging fund misappropriation and money laundering against Dr Yunus and Grameen Telecom officials were reportedly quashed.
B) Tax Relief and Policy Decisions Benefiting Yunus-linked Institutions
- 3 October 2024: A court ruling requiring Grameen Kalyan to pay BDT 666 crore in taxes was reportedly withdrawn.
- 12 October 2024: The National Board of Revenue reportedly granted Grameen Bank a five-year tax exemption.
- Post-power change, Dr Yunus’s supporters reportedly assumed full control of Grameen Bank.
- 17 April 2025: An amendment to the Grameen Bank Ordinance reportedly reduced government ownership from 25% to 10%, weakening public oversight.
C) Fast-tracked Approvals in Health, Education, Finance, and Labour Export
- 19 November 2024: RAJUK reportedly approved a 500-bed hospital project under Grameen Telecom Trust, combining a hospital, medical college, and health institute under a single authorisation—unprecedented in Bangladesh.
- 17 March 2025: The Secondary and Higher Education Division reportedly approved “Grameen University” under a Grameen trust, chaired by Md Ashraful Hasan, a long-time Yunus associate.
- 29 September 2024: Bangladesh Bank reportedly cleared Grameen Telecom to obtain a Payment Service Provider licence for “Samadhan Services Limited.”
- 20 March 2025: Grameen Employment Services Limited, reportedly owned by Dr Yunus, received manpower export authorisation despite no prior record in this sector.
D) Nepotistic and Politically Loaded Appointments
- Nurjahan Begum, a long-time Yunus associate, reportedly appointed Adviser for Health and Family Welfare.
- Lamya Morshed, a Canadian citizen and Executive Director of Yunus Centre, reportedly appointed Principal Coordinator for SDGs in the Chief Adviser’s Office at Senior Secretary rank.
- Apurbo Jahangir, Dr Yunus’s nephew, reportedly appointed Deputy Press Secretary to the Chief Adviser.
- Ashik Chowdhury, a British citizen and former Grameen Telecom Trust official, reportedly appointed Chair of both Bangladesh Investment Development Authority and Bangladesh Economic Zones Authority, with Minister of State rank.
E) “Golden Spectrum” Allocation
- 21 January 2026: Grameenphone reportedly received 10 MHz in the 700 MHz band (the “golden spectrum”) without an auction at BDT 237 crore per MHz for 15 years.
- The state reportedly lost at least BDT 25,000 crore in foregone value, while Dr Yunus benefits through ownership links.
- Appointment of Mahmud Hossain, an adviser at Grameen Telecom Trust, as BTRC Commissioner in September 2024 reportedly facilitated this outcome.
Implications of the Pattern
- Rapid legal relief for the head of the interim administration undermines judicial independence.
- Fiscal and ownership arrangements systematically favour Yunus-linked institutions, weakening public accountability.
- Strategic sectors opened rapidly to Yunus-linked entities, prioritising private gain over public interest.
- Patronage governance model embedded within state mechanisms raises conflicts of interest and accountability concerns.
- Regulatory capture distorts markets and transfers public value to entities linked to the interim head of government.
Conclusion: Interim Power Cannot Become Immunity
A republic can be hollowed out quietly—through approvals, legal reversals, and preferential policies, rather than tanks or speeches. What appears as discretion or reform is, when repeated systematically, a mechanism to serve the connected at the expense of the public.
Bangladesh deserves a government that resists conflicts of interest, not one that thrives on them. When rules favour the connected and penalise everyone else, the nation loses not only resources but the very meaning of citizenship.