Politics and Law
Research under this theme explores political authority, legal systems, and rights at national and international levels. Topics include democratic governance, migration, justice mechanisms, information integrity, and how laws and political institutions respond to social and security pressures.
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Politicians must be open to accepting electoral defeats
Three features distinguish the upcoming national election in ways rarely seen before: the resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami, the rise of Tarique Rahman as a central figure in contemporary politics, and—unthinkable until August 2024—the sidelining of the Awami League from the electoral contest.Since its role during the Liberation War—when it opposed the birth of Bangladesh, aided the Pakistan Army in committing genocide, and collaborated with al-Badr and al-Shams in the killing of intellectuals—Jamaat-e-Islami has remained one of the most controversial actors in our political history. Its refusal to apologise explicitly for its role in 1971 or seek forgiveness from the people of Bangladesh has long rendered its political acceptability deeply questionable.Its current position, articulated by party chief Dr Shafiqur Rahman—that “if we have committed any mistake since 1947 till date, we apologise for it”—is telling. By avoiding any direct reference to 1971, Jamaat continues to evade accountability for opposing the independence struggle and acting against the aspirations of freedom-loving people. This refusal remains among the most tragic aspects of our political journey.Yet despite this legacy, Jamaat is today a formidable presence in the upcoming election. Opinion polls suggest it may emerge as the second-largest party in the next parliament. How did a party burdened with such a past manage this resurgence?The most significant factor is Jamaat’s strategic mobilisation of the growing consciousness of Muslim identity among the majority of Bangladeshis, positioning itself as its most authentic representative. This was made possible by the failure of the two centrist parties—the Awami League in particular, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to a lesser extent—to firmly entrench a durable tradition of nationalistic and secular politics in the public imagination.Both parties governed the country since 1991, yet their performance increasingly alienated voters. The Awami League’s corrupt, exploitative, and oppressive rule over more than fifteen years—ending in August 2024—proved especially damaging. Ironically, a party whose legitimacy was rooted in its role in 1971 squandered that moral capital, opening space for Jamaat’s political rehabilitation.Jamaat’s ideological consistency, organisational discipline, and the dedication of its grassroots activists have further strengthened its position. Its long-term infiltration of Chhatra League structures, sometimes even assuming second-tier leadership roles, demonstrates strategic patience and organisational skill. Shibir’s recent victories in student union elections at five public universities further underline this success. Reports also suggest that Jamaat’s female grassroots workers have been particularly effective in door-to-door campaigning.In this context, Jamaat’s electoral ally, the National Citizen Party (NCP), also warrants attention. Born out of the July uprising, NCP entered electoral politics amid high expectations. Its decision to align with the Jamaat-led bloc may prove consequential—both in the immediate election and for its long-term political identity.The second defining feature of this election is the rise of Tarique Rahman. Though long regarded as the heir apparent, the scale and speed of his ascent have been striking. Operating from London for years while his mother remained incarcerated, he managed to keep the BNP not only alive but disciplined and cohesive—no small feat under relentless repression.Tarique Rahman’s direct communication with grassroots leaders through mobile and internet platforms fostered loyalty and pride among younger BNP activists. Repeated attempts by the Awami League to fracture the party or co-opt senior leaders were thwarted by his persuasive engagement. Fifteen years is a long time in Bangladeshi politics, and the BNP’s survival through that period is a testament to his organisational capacity.Many felt he delayed his return to Bangladesh after the fall of the Awami League government. Yet when he did return, the impact was immediate. His presence electrified party workers, energised supporters, and restored confidence. Massive public turnouts and warm receptions at his appearances have made him a central force in the electoral landscape.Thus far, he has conducted himself with restraint and maturity. His speeches have been measured, forward-looking, and policy-oriented—standing in contrast to the rhetoric-heavy approach of many others. Whether he has translated this momentum into effective nationwide campaign organisation will become clear only after the polls. But he has convincingly stepped into the political space once occupied by his late mother, whose janaza remains a powerful reminder of the affection and respect she commanded.The third and perhaps most consequential feature of this election is the effective exclusion of the Awami League. The party has not been formally banned, but its political activities have been. How could a party so integral to the birth and history of Bangladesh become so vulnerable as to be sidelined from a national election?The reasons are many—extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances—but the decisive factor lies in the brutal street violence during the final weeks of its rule. One incident encapsulates this collapse of legitimacy: the killing of Abu Sayed, an unarmed university student standing alone, posing no threat, shot dead by police. That single act symbolised the moral and political implosion of the regime.The government’s subsequent conduct—tampering with autopsy reports, attempting justification instead of accountability, and continuing the killing of demonstrators—sealed its fate. The loss was total: public trust, credibility, and legitimacy. The ban on AL’s activities flowed directly from this record.Where Awami League voters will shift their support on February 12 may well determine the election’s outcome.An additional feature worth noting is the eclipse of the Jatiya Party, once dominant under General HM Ershad and consistently the third-largest force in parliament since 1990. Its marginalisation reflects the profound restructuring underway in Bangladesh’s political order.Elections are always pivotal in a democracy. This year, however, they carry exceptional weight. Bangladesh urgently needs stability, predictability, an end to mobocracy, renewed investment, and restored public safety. These can only begin with an elected parliament, an accountable government, capable policymakers, and a clear national vision.We conclude with a warning drawn from experience. While we are enthusiastic about elections, we have historically been unwilling to accept defeat. Losing candidates accept results more readily than losing parties—those that fail to form the government often delegitimise the process itself. We have seen this repeatedly, even under caretaker governments.As we once observed, the mindset has been: an election is free and fair if we win, but rigged if we lose. This attitude must end.It is our sincere hope that all political actors accept the outcome with grace and dignity. If there are fact-based grounds for challenge, pursue them through the mechanisms laid down by the Election Commission. Do not resort to chaos or disruption. The nation must move forward—peacefully and urgently.Here’s to a free, fair, and peaceful election.Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star.Views expressed are the author’s own.
Election legitimacy and the absence of the Awami League
Apart from Bangladeshis’ understandable preoccupation with who will win the upcoming election—BNP or Jamaat-e-Islami—two further questions dominate discussion around the February 12 vote.First, will there be manipulation of votes, as has occurred to varying degrees in every election in Bangladesh, or will the result genuinely reflect the will of the electorate? Second, a question few are willing to raise openly within the country but which is discussed more freely abroad: can an election be considered fair and legitimate in the absence of the Awami League?This article is primarily concerned with the second question, though a brief comment on electoral manipulation is warranted. There is little doubt that nefarious actors exist—at both local and national levels—within all major party blocs, as well as within the administration and the security forces. If given the opportunity, such actors may seek to tilt the electoral process in favour of one side or another.While the government insists this will be the cleanest election in the country’s history, it remains uncertain whether sufficient safeguards and scrutiny exist—within the Election Commission, among observers, or in the media—to prevent rigging. Ultimately, this can only be judged on polling day itself and through subsequent reporting. That said, it appears likely that any manipulation, should it occur, would be relatively limited in scope.Even assuming there is no rigging, or no substantive rigging, the more fundamental question remains: can an election be described as “fair” or legitimate in the absence of the Awami League?In principle, a genuinely fair election should allow the participation of all political parties. Throughout Bangladesh’s history, the Awami League has consistently been either the most popular or the second most popular party. Even now, were it permitted to contest the election, the party would almost certainly win a number of seats—though not enough to secure overall victory. Its participation would nonetheless have a decisive impact on the outcome, shaping which of the remaining parties emerged on top and potentially allowing the Awami League to hold the balance of power.In short, an election that included the Awami League would look markedly different from the one scheduled to take place in just over a week’s time. This reasoning underpins the party’s claim that its exclusion is wholly unjustified and that any resulting government would lack legitimacy.In advancing this argument, however, the Awami League largely ignores the context in which the decision to exclude it was taken. That context is the party’s role in supporting—and in key respects facilitating—the government’s response to the July 2024 protests. As documented by the International Truth and Justice Project, detailed mapping of the violence confirms that more than 800 individuals were killed by law enforcement authorities during this period.This is not a peripheral matter. It is the central reason the party now finds itself outside the electoral process. Yet this context is not only downplayed by the Awami League itself; it is also frequently minimised or omitted by journalists and commentators sympathetic to the party’s current predicament.The key question, then, is whether this context is sufficient to justify the Awami League’s exclusion.One way to approach this is through a thought experiment: to consider how similar events would be viewed, and what political consequences would likely follow, if they occurred in another democratic country—however implausible that may seem.Imagine, for example, that something similar happened in Britain.The prime minister, Keir Starmer, orders the police and security forces to use lethal force against protesters. Over several weeks, hundreds are killed and thousands seriously injured. Almost all Labour ministers, MPs, and senior party figures either publicly support the policy, remain silent, or conspicuously fail to criticise it. Starmer and other senior figures actively encourage local Labour constituency organisations to mobilise in support of law enforcement. In some areas, Labour activists take to the streets backing the security forces; some even carry firearms and shoot at protesters.When the UK army refuses to fire on civilians, Starmer and a significant portion of the Labour leadership flee the country, taking refuge in France. The United Nations dispatches a fact-finding mission, which later concludes that, in support of the government, “violent elements associated with” the Labour Party systematically engaged in serious human rights violations, including “hundreds of extrajudicial killings.”Yet over the following year and a half, neither Starmer nor any senior Labour figure—whether abroad or at home—acknowledges the party’s or the government’s culpability. Leaked recordings even suggest that Starmer, who remains Labour leader, is encouraging party activists inside the UK to continue using violence.If such events were to occur in Britain—or in any other liberal democratic country—it is extremely difficult to imagine that the political establishment would allow the Labour Party to contest the next general election. The party would almost certainly be regarded as having crossed fundamental democratic red lines and would be barred from participation. Only after a clear break in leadership and a credible process of accountability might re-entry into electoral politics be conceivable.If such conduct would justify excluding a major party in the UK, it is difficult to argue that Bangladesh’s authorities are acting unreasonably in reaching a similar conclusion with respect to the Awami League. There are circumstances in which the exclusion of a major political party does not undermine an election’s legitimacy but instead represents a response to conduct that has placed that party, at least temporarily, outside the bounds of democratic acceptability. The Awami League’s response to the July uprising constitutes such a circumstance.It is true that Bangladesh has no shortage of highly partisan opponents of the Awami League who, for their own political purposes, exaggerate the extent to which the entire party—at national, district, and local levels—was complicit in the July killings. This overreach is reflected in the criminalisation of party activities and in the arrest and imprisonment of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of party members without supporting evidence.These excesses are real, troubling, and must be acknowledged. But one need not accept exaggerated claims or endorse abusive legal measures to recognise the force of the narrower argument: that the Awami League, in its current form, should not be permitted to contest this election. Even allowing for exaggeration and abuse by its opponents, the core justification for the party’s exclusion remains intact. On that basis, an election held without the Awami League cannot simply be dismissed as illegitimate.That said, the party’s exclusion is not cost-free. It significantly distorts the electoral landscape. A substantial segment of the electorate—long-standing Awami League supporters—is effectively disenfranchised, forced either to vote for parties they do not support or to abstain altogether. This reality cannot be ignored. Even if the party’s exclusion is justified, its complete absence from the political arena is not healthy for Bangladesh’s democratic development.For this reason, one need not support the Awami League to argue that serious efforts should be made in the coming years to enable the emergence of a renewed party: one grounded in its historic commitments to 1971, secularism, and social liberalism, but led by new leadership that has clearly and credibly broken with those directly responsible for the July killings. A return to normal democratic competition will require the party to undertake a genuine process of accountability, reckoning, and reform—and it must be both encouraged and pressured to do so.If such a process is to be possible, the next elected government will have a crucial role to play. It must move away from some of the most damaging practices of the interim period, including the blanket banning of Awami League activities and the use of mass arrests and prolonged detention without evidence. Only prosecutions supported by credible and sufficient evidence should proceed; all others should be released. Those within the party who seek reform cannot begin that difficult work while a boot remains on the party’s neck. David BergmanX (formerly Twitter): @TheDavidBergmanThe views expressed in this article are the author’s own.
Bangladesh election: What’s at stake for India, China, and Pakistan?
As Bangladesh prepares to hold its first election since the overthrow of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League government in 2024, neighbouring India, Pakistan, and China are watching closely.The country is currently governed by an interim administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. The two principal parties competing for power in this month’s polls are the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JIB), both of which began campaigning in late January.The Awami League—historically one of Bangladesh’s dominant political forces and a close ally of India—has been barred from contesting the election due to its role in the violent crackdown on student-led protests in 2024. Former prime minister Hasina, now 78 and living in exile in India, was found guilty of authorising the use of lethal force against protesters, during which at least 1,400 people were killed.In November last year, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal tried Hasina in absentia and sentenced her to death. India has so far refused to extradite her.Hasina has denounced the upcoming election, telling the Associated Press last month that “a government born of exclusion cannot unite a divided nation.”Since her ousting, analysts say Bangladesh’s geopolitical posture has undergone a significant shift.“Bilateral relations with India have reached a historic low, while ties with Pakistan have warmed considerably. At the same time, strategic engagement with China has deepened,” said Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan, a lecturer in global studies and governance at Independent University, Bangladesh.He noted that Hasina’s 15-year rule was defined by three key foreign policy pillars: close and comprehensive relations with India; diplomatic distance from Pakistan; and a carefully calibrated partnership with China focused on defence, trade, and infrastructure.“That predictable alignment has now been reversed with respect to India and Pakistan, and recalibrated in relation to China,” Rejwan said.So how do India, Pakistan, and China view the upcoming election—and does the outcome matter to them? India-Bangladesh relationsUntil Hasina’s fall, India regarded Bangladesh as a critical strategic partner in South Asia. India is Bangladesh’s largest Asian trading partner, exporting goods worth $11.1bn between April 2023 and March 2024, while importing $1.8bn worth of Bangladeshi products.Since Hasina fled to India, however, relations have deteriorated sharply. Both countries have imposed trade restrictions amid rising political tensions.Although India supported Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan in 1971, bilateral relations have fluctuated over the decades depending on which party governed in Dhaka. Hasina, who served as prime minister from 1996 to 2001 and again from 2009 to 2024, maintained particularly close ties with New Delhi.In 2020, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi described bilateral ties as a “golden chapter.” Yet Hasina’s opponents frequently accused her of being overly accommodating to Indian interests.Anti-India sentiment intensified following her ouster and India’s refusal to extradite her. Relations worsened further after the killing of Osman Hadi, a prominent anti-India protest leader, which sparked demonstrations targeting Indian interests in Bangladesh.India has also raised concerns about the treatment of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority under the interim government. Diplomatic friction has spilled into sports as well: after Bangladesh requested that its T20 World Cup matches in India be relocated to Sri Lanka, the ICC expelled Bangladesh from the tournament. Pakistan later backed Bangladesh, refusing to play India in solidarity.“India suffered a major strategic setback with Hasina’s removal,” said Michael Kugelman, senior fellow for South Asia at the Atlantic Council. “New Delhi has been uneasy with an interim government it views as influenced by Jamaat and other religious actors.”Despite tensions, Modi and Yunus met last year on the sidelines of a BIMSTEC summit, where India reiterated its support for a “democratic, stable, peaceful, and inclusive Bangladesh.” How India views the electionIndia’s stakes are high.“New Delhi wants a government in Dhaka that is willing to engage constructively and is not influenced by actors it perceives as security threats,” Kugelman said.While India would be most comfortable with a BNP-led government, it has also reached out to Jamaat leaders, reflecting uncertainty about the election outcome.“India recognises that the Awami League is unlikely to return to power in the near future,” Kugelman said. “It would accept a BNP government and work to repair the relationship.” Pakistan-Bangladesh relationsSince Hasina’s removal, Pakistan has moved quickly to rebuild ties with Dhaka. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met Yunus twice in 2024, and the two countries have resumed direct trade and flights for the first time in more than a decade. Defence and military dialogues have also restarted.Analysts say Pakistan sees an opportunity to expand influence by exploiting anti-India sentiment and Islamist political momentum in Bangladesh.“Pakistan wants to heighten India’s eastern security concerns by drawing closer to Dhaka,” Rejwan said, adding that Islamabad has also promoted the idea of a Bangladesh-China-Pakistan trilateral alignment. How Pakistan views the electionPakistan would welcome either a BNP or Jamaat victory, though a Jamaat-led government would be its preferred outcome, Kugelman said.A BNP government, however, would likely maintain balanced ties rather than align strongly with Islamabad. “BNP’s policy is Bangladesh first,” Rejwan noted, “which means strategic hedging rather than dependence on any single external power.” China-Bangladesh relationsChina’s influence in Bangladesh has expanded steadily, regardless of which party is in power. Under both Hasina and Yunus, Beijing has invested heavily in infrastructure, defence cooperation, and development projects. The interim government has secured more than $2.1bn in Chinese investments and loans.China has also pledged support for managing the Rohingya refugee crisis and has discussed potential defence deals, including fighter jet purchases.“Beijing adjusted quickly to the new political reality,” Rejwan said. “Sino-Bangladesh relations were strong under Hasina and are even stronger under the interim administration.” How China views the electionChina has actively engaged all major Bangladeshi political parties ahead of the polls but is not seen as favouring any single outcome.“For Beijing, political stability is paramount,” Kugelman said. “It wants to protect its investments and limit external—particularly US—influence.”Rejwan added that China prefers inclusive engagement with all political actors and is prepared to work with whichever party forms the next government. Source: Al JazeeraThe views and analysis presented here are drawn from Al Jazeera reporting.
Deeply insecure: Why Bangladeshi minorities are scared ahead of elections
Sukumar Pramanik, a Hindu teacher in Rajshahi city – about 250km (155 miles) from Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka – says the country’s upcoming national election could be his final test of trust in politics.Electoral periods in Bangladesh have seen spikes in communal and political violence throughout the country’s history, with religious minorities often bearing the brunt amid intense political competition and social tension.Recommended StoriesBut since August 2024, and the end of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s rule, minorities in Bangladesh have felt under siege, with reports of attacks, killings and arson against their property, even though the government insists that most incidents were not motivated by religious hate.That backdrop has intensified fears ahead of the February 12 election, despite efforts by leading political parties to reach out to minority communities. “The leaders of major parties have assured us that we will be safe before and after the vote,” Pramanik said, but faith in politicians runs low in his community at the moment.After the August 2024 uprising that led to Hasina’s ouster, mobs in several parts of the country targeted the Hindu community, many of whose members had historically voted for Hasina’s Awami League, which has long tried to claim a “secular” mantle — even though critics have accused the party of failing to prevent attacks on minorities during its long years in power, and indulging in scaremongering.Pramanik said a mob from his village attacked the Hindu community in Rajshahi’s Bidyadharpur, beating him and breaking his hand. He required surgery and spent days in hospital. “I stood in front of the mob believing they knew me and would not attack me,” he said. “They broke my hand – but more than that, they broke my heart and my trust. I had never experienced anything like this before.” Dhaka, Bangladesh — Sukumar Pramanik, a Hindu teacher in Rajshahi city – about 250km (155 miles) from Bangladesh’s capital, Dhaka – says the country’s upcoming national election could be his final test of trust in politics.Electoral periods in Bangladesh have seen spikes in communal and political violence throughout the country’s history, with religious minorities often bearing the brunt amid intense political competition and social tension.Recommended StoriesBut since August 2024, and the end of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s rule, minorities in Bangladesh have felt under siege, with reports of attacks, killings and arson against their property, even though the government insists that most incidents were not motivated by religious hate.That backdrop has intensified fears ahead of the February 12 election, despite efforts by leading political parties to reach out to minority communities. “The leaders of major parties have assured us that we will be safe before and after the vote,” Pramanik said, but faith in politicians runs low in his community at the moment.After the August 2024 uprising that led to Hasina’s ouster, mobs in several parts of the country targeted the Hindu community, many of whose members had historically voted for Hasina’s Awami League, which has long tried to claim a “secular” mantle — even though critics have accused the party of failing to prevent attacks on minorities during its long years in power, and indulging in scaremongering.Pramanik said a mob from his village attacked the Hindu community in Rajshahi’s Bidyadharpur, beating him and breaking his hand. He required surgery and spent days in hospital. “I stood in front of the mob believing they knew me and would not attack me,” he said. “They broke my hand – but more than that, they broke my heart and my trust. I had never experienced anything like this before.”Now, sporadic attacks in recent months ahead of the election have revived those fears. According to the BHBCUC, at least 522 communal attacks were recorded in 2025, including 61 killings. The group says 2,184 incidents took place in 2024 following Hasina’s removal in August that year.Minorities are now “deeply insecure” ahead of the election, Nath said. “There is fear among everyone,” he added.The Bangladesh government disputes claims of widespread communal violence. According to official data, in 2025, authorities recorded 645 incidents involving members of minority communities. Of these, the government says, only 71 had “communal elements”, while the remainder were classified as general criminal acts. Officials argue the figures show that most incidents involving minorities were not driven by religious hostility, stressing the need to distinguish communal violence from broader law-and-order crimes.At a national level, Bangladesh faces persistent law-and-order challenges, with an average of 3,000 to 3,500 violent crime deaths each year, according to official figures.The government has also suggested that the issue has been politicised internationally, particularly by the Indian media and officials, since the fall of Hasina’s government.Rights groups, however, present different data. Ain o Salish Kendra, a prominent human rights organisation, documented 221 incidents of communal violence in 2025, including one death and 17 injuries — lower than the BHBCUC’s count, but higher than the government’s data.And the differing numbers notwithstanding, interviews with minority communities point to deep anxiety shaped by recent lived experience. ‘Not another mental trauma’Shefali Sarkar, a homemaker in Bidyadharpur in Rajshahi, saw her life turn upside down on the afternoon of August 5, 2024 — the day Hasina fled, seeking exile in India.As fears of an attack spread, most men in the community fled, leaving the women behind in their homes. Mobs primarily targeted men in the aftermath of Hasina’s ouster.“They started vandalising our house. I thought this was it – that we were going to die,” Shefali said, still visibly shaken when recalling the day. “It left a deep scar in my mind, and I have needed mental health treatment after this.”With elections approaching, Shefali said her anxiety has returned, fearing that any fresh unrest could once again make her community a target. “I cannot go through another mental trauma,” she said.Her husband, Narayan Sarkar, said the area has remained calm since the attack and that local Muslim residents and political leaders have assured them of protection. “But the fear always remains – peace can be taken away at any time,” he said.‘Unrest might spread’Not everyone is as worried.Shaymol Karmokar, from central Bangladesh’s Faridpur district, is the secretary of the local Durga Puja celebration committee. Durga Puja is a major Hindu Bengali festival, celebrated in Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal.“We have traditionally maintained strong communal harmony here over the years,” Karmokar said. “Many areas reported attacks during the uprising, but nothing happened in our locality.”He added that political leaders had actively sought minority votes and promised to ensure their safety. “We will vote and expect a peaceful election,” he said.Indeed, BNP leader Tarique Rahman — former PM Khaleda Zia’s son — has spoken of his desire to build an inclusive Bangladesh where all communities, irrespective of faith, feel safe and secure.And the Jamaat-e-Islami, the BNP’s principal challenger in the elections, has for the first time nominated a Hindu candidate, from the city of Khulna, as part of its outreach to the community.Still, in Gopalganj, where about a quarter of voters are Hindu, worries about election violence are high.In one heavily Hindu-populated constituency of the district — which is also Hasina’s birthplace — Govinda Pramanik, secretary-general of the Bangladesh Jatiya Hindu Mohajote [Bangladesh National Hindu Grand Alliance] and an independent candidate, said he was scared that “unrest might spread around this election”, he said.BHBCUC’s Nath said the government and election authorities could have done more to assuage concerns of minorities. “Even now, as the Election Commission operates, it has not once asked religious minorities what problems they are facing or what support they need,” he said.Shafiqul Alam, press secretary to Muhammad Yunus, head of Bangladesh’s interim government, however, said authorities have taken steps to protect minorities and ensure a safe election. “We have taken adequate measures so that people of all communities – minorities and majorities, followers of all faiths and identities – can vote in a festive atmosphere,” Alam told Al Jazeera. “They could not vote freely under Sheikh Hasina over the last 15 years, as the elections were rigged.”“Our priority is to ensure that everyone can vote this time,” he added, insisting that the government had consulted minority communities and addressed their concerns.Back in Bidyadharpur village in Rajshahi, Sukumar Pramanik said he was weighing these assurances carefully. “If we come under attack again,” he said, “this will be the last time I place my trust in them.” Source : Al-JazeeraPublised Date: 01 feb 2026
Engineering February: Yunus, Jamaat, and the Manufacturing of Power
A recent report in The Washington Post cited a US diplomat working in Bangladesh, claiming Washington wants to build “friendly relations” with Jamaat-e-Islami. The diplomat reportedly made the remarks in a closed-door discussion with a group of Bangladeshi women journalists on 1 December. The newspaper’s report, we are told, was built around an audio recording of that conversation.In that recording, the diplomat expressed optimism that Jamaat would perform far better in the 12 February election than it has in the past. He even suggested the journalists invite representatives of Jamaat’s student wing to their programmes and events.When the journalists raised a fear that Jamaat, if empowered, could enforce Sharia law, the diplomat’s response was striking: he said he did not believe Jamaat would implement Sharia. And even if it did, he added, Washington could respond with measures such as tariffs. He was also heard arguing that Jamaat includes many university graduates in leadership and would not take such a decision.The Washington Post further quoted multiple political analysts suggesting Jamaat could achieve its best result in history in the 12 February vote and might even end up in power.So, is this report simply the product of an “audio leak” published just 20 days before the interim government’s election? I don’t think so.First, it stretches belief that Bangladeshi journalists would secretly record a closed conversation with a US diplomat and then pass it to The Washington Post. Second, The Washington Post would almost certainly have cross-checked the audio with the diplomat concerned. If the diplomat had objected, it is hard to imagine the paper moving ahead in this way. My conclusion is blunt: this was published with the diplomat’s planning, or at least with the US embassy’s consent.Call it what it is: a soft signal. A carefully calibrated message designed to project reassurance about Jamaat and to normalise the idea of Jamaat as a legitimate future governing force.And then came the echo.At the same time, two other international outlets, Reuters and Al Jazeera, also published reports about Jamaat-e-Islami. Both pointed towards the possibility of a strong Jamaat showing in the 12 February election. Al Jazeera’s tone, heavy with praise, makes it difficult not to suspect paid campaigning. More tellingly, an Al Jazeera poll recently put Jamaat’s public support at 33.6%, compared with 34.7% for the BNP.The goal is obvious: to “naturalise” Jamaat’s pathway to power. To make what should shock the public feel ordinary. To convert the unthinkable into the plausible, and the plausible into the inevitable.Which brings us to the unavoidable question: can Jamaat really win?History says no. The highest share of the vote Jamaat ever secured in a normal election was in 1991: 12.13%. In the next three elections, Jamaat’s vote share fell to 8.68%, 4.28%, and 4.7%. In a genuinely competitive election, Jamaat is not a double-digit party.But Bangladesh is not heading into a normal election. An unelected, illegitimate interim administration is preparing a managed vote while keeping the country’s largest political party, the Awami League, effectively outside the electoral process. In that distorted arena, behind-the-scenes engineering is underway to seat Jamaat on the throne. The diplomat’s “leak”, the favourable international coverage, and the publication of flattering polls are not isolated incidents. They are the components of a single operation.If anyone doubts the direction of travel, they should remember what happened after 5 August. In his first public remarks after that date, the army chief repeatedly addressed Jamaat’s leader with reverential language, calling him “Ameer-e-Jamaat”. From that moment onwards, Jamaat has exerted an outsized, near-monopolistic influence over Bangladesh’s political field.Yes, Khaleda Zia’s illness, Tarique Rahman’s possible return, and even the prospect of Khaleda Zia’s death have periodically given the BNP a breeze at its back. But the reel and string of the political kite are now held elsewhere. Jamaat controls the tempo.And it did not happen in a vacuum. The Awami League has been driven off the streets through mob violence, persecution, repression and judicial harassment. With its principal rival forced away from political life, Jamaat has been able to present itself not merely as a participant, but as an authority.Now look at the state itself.Every major organ of power, it is argued, is being brought under Jamaat’s influence. Within the military, “Islamisation” is being used as a cover for Jamaatisation. Fifteen decorated army officers are reportedly jailed on allegations connected to the disappearance of Abdullah Hil Azmi, the son of Ghulam Azam, widely regarded as a leading figure among the razakars. Yet it remains unclear whether Azmi was even abducted at all.The judiciary, too, is described as falling almost entirely under Jamaat’s control. Key administrative positions, especially DCs, SPs, UNOs and OCs, are increasingly occupied by Jamaat-aligned officials.On campuses, the story repeats itself. Through engineered student union elections, Jamaat’s student organisation, Islami Chhatra Shibir, has established dominance in Dhaka University and other leading public universities. Even vice-chancellor appointments are described as being shaped by Jamaat-friendly influence.And while this internal consolidation accelerates, external courtship intensifies.Since August 2024, Jamaat leaders have reportedly held at least four meetings in Washington with US authorities. Their close contact with the US embassy in Bangladesh continues. Meanwhile, the British High Commissioner has held multiple meetings with Jamaat’s ameer, widely reported in the media. Jamaat’s ameer has also visited the United Kingdom recently.In short, Jamaat has reached a level of favourable conditions never seen since its founding. Not even in Pakistan, the birthplace of its ideological ecosystem.So why would sections of the Western world want Jamaat? What does the Yunus-led interim administration gain from this? What role is it playing?The answer offered here is uncompromising: the current interim government has signed multiple agreements with Western powers, particularly the United States, including an NDA arrangement and various trade deals that are described as being against public interest. Some may be public. Much remains opaque. The government wants these agreements protected. It also wants long-term leverage over Bangladesh’s politics and territory.From a broader geopolitical perspective, Bangladesh’s land matters. It sits at a strategic crossroads. For those intent on consolidating dominance in the Asia-Pacific and simultaneously containing the influence of both China and India, Bangladesh is useful. This is part of a long game.And if Jamaat, with weak popular legitimacy, can be installed in power, external agendas become easier to execute. The argument is stark: Jamaat, as a party of war criminals and anti-liberation forces, has no natural sense of accountability to Bangladesh’s soil or its people. In exchange for power, it would hand foreign actors a blank cheque.Now to Dr Yunus.The claim here is that since taking power, Yunus has already fulfilled his personal ambitions. He has rewarded loyalists with state titles and positions, creating opportunities for them to accumulate money. He has satisfied the demands of the “deep state” that installed him. In doing so, the country’s interests have been sacrificed at every step.And throughout, Jamaat has offered Yunus unconditional support.After the election, Yunus’s priority will be survival: a safe exit for himself and his circle. That is tied to securing the future of the student leaders who claim to have been the principal stakeholders of July. In this narrative, Jamaat is stepping in again. The NCP has already aligned with Jamaat. To maintain international lobbying strength, Jamaat will ensure Yunus’s safe exit. It may even install him in the presidency if that serves the arrangement.So what will the BNP do?The answer given is grim: very little. Blinded by the hunger for power, the BNP has nodded along as Yunus and his circle pushed forward actions described as hostile to the national interest. Mirza Fakhrul has publicly claimed to see Zia within Yunus. Tarique Rahman has repeatedly been seen praising Yunus. All of it, the argument goes, for a single purpose: to reach power.But the BNP, it is suggested, failed to understand the real game. At the grassroots, many of its leaders and activists have become disconnected from the public through extortion, land-grabbing and violent intimidation. Even when visible irregularities occurred in student union elections at universities, the BNP’s student wing, Chhatra Dal, either did not protest or could not.If Jamaat takes power through a staged election on 12 February, the BNP will have no meaningful recourse left.And the country?The conclusion is bleak: Bangladeshis should not expect their suffering to end any time soon. Just as a meticulously designed operation removed an elected Awami League government, another meticulous design is now being finalised to seat Jamaat-e-Islami, a party branded by the author as one of war criminals, with the backing of foreign powers.Yunus’s anti-national agreements, it is argued, will be implemented through Jamaat’s hands. Independence, sovereignty and the constitution will be thrown into the dustbin. Secularism, women’s freedom, and minority rights will be locked away in cold storage. The destination is spelled out without ambiguity:Bangladesh will become the Islamic Republic of Bangladesh.
The Cost of Politicising Academia: Lessons for Bangladesh’s Public Universities
Public universities in Bangladesh – most notably the University of Dhaka – have historically played a defining role in shaping the nation’s political and social trajectory. As a graduate of Dhaka University, I am acutely aware of its unique place in the country’s collective memory and democratic struggles. From the Language Movement of 1952 to the Liberation War of 1971, and later the anti-autocracy movements of the 1980s and 1990s, student-led activism rooted in moral conviction and the public good helped steer Bangladesh through its most critical moments. Academics often supported these struggles discreetly, preserving the university as a space for intellectual resistance rather than partisan allegiance.Even today, Dhaka University remains a critical site of resistance and political mobilisation, reasserting its role as a battleground of change during the student-led uprising of 2024. Yet this proud legacy stands in sharp contrast to the steady erosion of academic neutrality witnessed over the past three decades.Student politics gradually became an extension of mainstream party politics, with campuses and residential halls turning into partisan strongholds. Ordinary students, especially those unaffiliated with ruling factions or other political parties, were frequently marginalised, intimidated, or excluded from opportunities. What once empowered students to speak truth to power increasingly silenced them.This politicisation did not stop with students. Over the last decade, academic and administrative staff in public universities became deeply entangled in partisan networks. Many colleagues privately admitted that professional survival often depended on displaying allegiance – real or performative – to the ruling establishment. Those who remained neutral or critical risked stalled promotions, administrative sidelining, hostile work environments, or worse. As a result, universities lost the protected intellectual space necessary for genuine teaching, learning, and research.One of the most damaging consequences was the erosion of meritocracy. Academics with limited teaching engagement and little or no research record were promoted to senior ranks or influential administrative positions due to political connections rather than academic excellence. This weakened institutional leadership, demoralised capable scholars, and discouraged early-career academics from pursuing excellence. Institutional instability deepened as qualified leaders were pushed aside during political transitions.The ripple effects were profound and long-lasting. Politically aligned students were often favoured, disadvantaging neutral students and corroding trust in student–teacher relationships. Research funding and institutional investments were sometimes unevenly distributed, favouring departments with greater political leverage rather than academic need or performance. Over time, public confidence in universities began to erode, and international standing suffered as academic independence became increasingly questionable.Having studied and taught across Asia, Australia, North America, and Europe, I have rarely witnessed universities so overtly shaped by partisan loyalty. Universities elsewhere function primarily as spaces for scholarship, debate, and intellectual disagreement – not political mobilisation.A new Bangladesh offers an opportunity to reset. Public universities must be decisively de-politicised, particularly at academic and administrative levels. Healthy, issue-based student debate should be encouraged but insulated from party control. Transparent, merit-based criteria for recruitment and promotion must be restored and strictly enforced. Teaching quality, research output, leadership ability, and service to society – not political identity – should determine academic advancement.Bangladesh can learn from global best practices. Universities should promote respectful, evidence-based dialogue while rejecting intimidation and exclusion. Safeguarding intellectual freedom and open inquiry must be central to reform.Finally, sustained investment is essential: stronger funding for teaching and research, expanded international training and collaboration, merit-based scholarships, student exchange programmes, and opportunities for leading Bangladeshi academics abroad to contribute to rebuilding institutions at home. Rebuilding trust will take time, but reclaiming academic independence is the first and most necessary step towards restoring the glory, credibility, and global standing of Bangladesh’s public universities. Key Takeaways• Depoliticise universities and protect academic neutrality.• Restore merit-based recruitment and promotion.• End intimidation and partisan control on campuses.• Strengthen research, teaching, and international collaboration.• Rebuild trust and global credibility of public universities.