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Three features distinguish the upcoming national election in ways rarely seen before: the resurgence of Jamaat-e-Islami, the rise of Tarique Rahman as a central figure in contemporary politics, and—unthinkable until August 2024—the sidelining of the Awami League from the electoral contest.
Since its role during the Liberation War—when it opposed the birth of Bangladesh, aided the Pakistan Army in committing genocide, and collaborated with al-Badr and al-Shams in the killing of intellectuals—Jamaat-e-Islami has remained one of the most controversial actors in our political history. Its refusal to apologise explicitly for its role in 1971 or seek forgiveness from the people of Bangladesh has long rendered its political acceptability deeply questionable.
Its current position, articulated by party chief Dr Shafiqur Rahman—that “if we have committed any mistake since 1947 till date, we apologise for it”—is telling. By avoiding any direct reference to 1971, Jamaat continues to evade accountability for opposing the independence struggle and acting against the aspirations of freedom-loving people. This refusal remains among the most tragic aspects of our political journey.
Yet despite this legacy, Jamaat is today a formidable presence in the upcoming election. Opinion polls suggest it may emerge as the second-largest party in the next parliament. How did a party burdened with such a past manage this resurgence?
The most significant factor is Jamaat’s strategic mobilisation of the growing consciousness of Muslim identity among the majority of Bangladeshis, positioning itself as its most authentic representative. This was made possible by the failure of the two centrist parties—the Awami League in particular, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party to a lesser extent—to firmly entrench a durable tradition of nationalistic and secular politics in the public imagination.
Both parties governed the country since 1991, yet their performance increasingly alienated voters. The Awami League’s corrupt, exploitative, and oppressive rule over more than fifteen years—ending in August 2024—proved especially damaging. Ironically, a party whose legitimacy was rooted in its role in 1971 squandered that moral capital, opening space for Jamaat’s political rehabilitation.
Jamaat’s ideological consistency, organisational discipline, and the dedication of its grassroots activists have further strengthened its position. Its long-term infiltration of Chhatra League structures, sometimes even assuming second-tier leadership roles, demonstrates strategic patience and organisational skill. Shibir’s recent victories in student union elections at five public universities further underline this success. Reports also suggest that Jamaat’s female grassroots workers have been particularly effective in door-to-door campaigning.
In this context, Jamaat’s electoral ally, the National Citizen Party (NCP), also warrants attention. Born out of the July uprising, NCP entered electoral politics amid high expectations. Its decision to align with the Jamaat-led bloc may prove consequential—both in the immediate election and for its long-term political identity.
The second defining feature of this election is the rise of Tarique Rahman. Though long regarded as the heir apparent, the scale and speed of his ascent have been striking. Operating from London for years while his mother remained incarcerated, he managed to keep the BNP not only alive but disciplined and cohesive—no small feat under relentless repression.
Tarique Rahman’s direct communication with grassroots leaders through mobile and internet platforms fostered loyalty and pride among younger BNP activists. Repeated attempts by the Awami League to fracture the party or co-opt senior leaders were thwarted by his persuasive engagement. Fifteen years is a long time in Bangladeshi politics, and the BNP’s survival through that period is a testament to his organisational capacity.
Many felt he delayed his return to Bangladesh after the fall of the Awami League government. Yet when he did return, the impact was immediate. His presence electrified party workers, energised supporters, and restored confidence. Massive public turnouts and warm receptions at his appearances have made him a central force in the electoral landscape.
Thus far, he has conducted himself with restraint and maturity. His speeches have been measured, forward-looking, and policy-oriented—standing in contrast to the rhetoric-heavy approach of many others. Whether he has translated this momentum into effective nationwide campaign organisation will become clear only after the polls. But he has convincingly stepped into the political space once occupied by his late mother, whose janaza remains a powerful reminder of the affection and respect she commanded.
The third and perhaps most consequential feature of this election is the effective exclusion of the Awami League. The party has not been formally banned, but its political activities have been. How could a party so integral to the birth and history of Bangladesh become so vulnerable as to be sidelined from a national election?
The reasons are many—extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances—but the decisive factor lies in the brutal street violence during the final weeks of its rule. One incident encapsulates this collapse of legitimacy: the killing of Abu Sayed, an unarmed university student standing alone, posing no threat, shot dead by police. That single act symbolised the moral and political implosion of the regime.
The government’s subsequent conduct—tampering with autopsy reports, attempting justification instead of accountability, and continuing the killing of demonstrators—sealed its fate. The loss was total: public trust, credibility, and legitimacy. The ban on AL’s activities flowed directly from this record.
Where Awami League voters will shift their support on February 12 may well determine the election’s outcome.
An additional feature worth noting is the eclipse of the Jatiya Party, once dominant under General HM Ershad and consistently the third-largest force in parliament since 1990. Its marginalisation reflects the profound restructuring underway in Bangladesh’s political order.
Elections are always pivotal in a democracy. This year, however, they carry exceptional weight. Bangladesh urgently needs stability, predictability, an end to mobocracy, renewed investment, and restored public safety. These can only begin with an elected parliament, an accountable government, capable policymakers, and a clear national vision.
We conclude with a warning drawn from experience. While we are enthusiastic about elections, we have historically been unwilling to accept defeat. Losing candidates accept results more readily than losing parties—those that fail to form the government often delegitimise the process itself. We have seen this repeatedly, even under caretaker governments.
As we once observed, the mindset has been: an election is free and fair if we win, but rigged if we lose. This attitude must end.
It is our sincere hope that all political actors accept the outcome with grace and dignity. If there are fact-based grounds for challenge, pursue them through the mechanisms laid down by the Election Commission. Do not resort to chaos or disruption. The nation must move forward—peacefully and urgently.
Here’s to a free, fair, and peaceful election.
Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star.
Views expressed are the author’s own.